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KELO SIX YEARS LATER: STATE RESPONSES, 
RAMIFICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE 
Asher Alavi* 
Abstract: In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
eminent domain takings that benefit private developers in Kelo v. City of 
New London. The case led to public outcry on both the right and the left 
and the revision of many state eminent domain laws to curtail such tak-
ings. However, most of the new laws have been ineffective. In many states, 
the burden of the takings falls largely onto poor, minority communities 
while, in others, revitalization projects by private developers are prohib-
ited entirely. This Note examines the negative implications of current ap-
proaches to takings on inner-city, minority communities and concludes 
that states should adopt an approach that allows revitalization of blighted 
areas by private developers but also provides effective limits such as a nar-
row definition of blight, enhanced compensation for the displaced, and 
procedural provisions such as Community Benefits Agreements. 
Introduction 
 The story of Susette Kelo’s fight to prevent the City of New Lon-
don, the State of Connecticut, and the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer 
from taking her home struck a nerve throughout America.1 Kelo’s 
home was not in a slum and there was no declaration that her house 
was in disrepair.2 Instead, her property faced condemnation to allow 
Pfizer and New London to accomplish an ambitious economic revitali-
zation plan that would include a new research and development facility 
for Pfizer at its center and would provide the city with a waterfront 
shopping area, conference hotel, condominium units, parks, and ma-
                                                                                                                      
* Note Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. 
L. Rev. 2100, 2109 (2009); Will Lovell, Note, The Kelo Blowback: How the Newly-Enacted Emi-
nent Domain Statutes and Past Blight Statutes Are a Maginot Line-Defense Mechanism for All Non-
Affluent and Minority Property Owners, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 609, 610 (2007); Avi Salzman & 
Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court Ruling, N.Y. Times, June 
24, 2005, at A20. 
2 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005). 
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rinas.3 Although groups across the political spectrum were rooting for 
Kelo’s “David” to win a victory for private property owners, the Su-
preme Court came out in favor of “Goliath.”4 In its now-infamous opin-
ion, Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court announced that eco-
nomic revitalization projects by private developers are constitutional 
“public uses” that justify the use of eminent domain.5 
 Five years after the decision, not only did Pfizer walk away from its 
ambitious project, but public fear and anger over the implications of the 
decision have also led to more restrictive legislation in several states and 
multiple referenda on private eminent domain takings.6 In the after-
math of Kelo, forty-three states amended their eminent domain laws and 
seven states changed their constitutions to limit “economic develop-
ment” projects like the one at issue in Kelo.7 Despite the public backlash, 
the majority of state eminent domain laws do little to limit takings for 
“economic revitalization” projects by private developers.8 Instead, most 
states satisfied the public outcry against Kelo by limiting eminent domain 
for private developers to situations of “blight” which, broadly defined, 
covers most properties in poor areas or with an economic or physical 
defect.9 For instance, Illinois exempts condemnations for blight from its 
ban on economic development takings and broadly defines blight as an 
area where buildings or improvements are detrimental to the public 
safety, health, or welfare because of a combination of five or more fac-
tors.10 The factors listed include dilapidation, deterioration, excessive 
vacancies, deleterious land-use layout, overcrowding of structures and 
community facilities, and lack of community planning.11 Such broad 
exceptions would allow private “economic redevelopment” takings to 
take place in many areas, but it is particularly poor, inner-city communi-
                                                                                                                      
3 See id. at 474. 
4 See Anastasia C. Scheffler-Wood, Comment, Where Do We Go From Here? States Revise 
Eminent Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 617, 638 (2006); Terry Pris-
tin, Connecticut Homeowners Say Eminent Domain Isn’t a Revenue Raising Device, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 8, 2004, at C8 (noting that the Kelo fight led to strange alliances between disparate 
groups including the conservative Institute for Justice, the ACLU, and Ralph Nader). 
5 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–89. 
6 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2101–02 (describing the massive backlash from across the 
political spectrum that spurred the development of new state legislation on eminent do-
main); Lovell, supra note 1, at 610. 
7 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2101–02. 
8 See id. at 2105, 2114 (noting that twenty-two of the thirty-four new state laws are 
“largely symbolic in nature, providing little or no protection for property owners”). 
9 See id. at 2114. 
10 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1) (2006); Somin, supra note 1, at 2125. 
11 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2125–26. 
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ties that are characterized by such attributes.12 Because such communi-
ties are predominantly composed of minorities, are the least politically 
connected, and have the lowest property values, they face an additional 
risk of displacement for tax-boosting corporate projects like the one 
pursued by Pfizer.13 Eminent domain takings like these signal a return 
to the racially disproportionate “urban renewal” programs that occurred 
between 1949 and 1976, when states and cities used federal funds and 
“blight” condemnations to clear out poor, minority neighborhoods, ex-
pand downtown areas, and prevent the exodus of affluent residents and 
businesses to the suburbs.14 Thus, instead of solving the perceived injus-
tice of the Kelo decision, state laws restricting private economic revitali-
zation projects to “blighted areas” will largely shift the burden of these 
takings to poor and minority citizens.15 
 A minority of states, recognizing the problems with allowing pri-
vate development trends to continue under the pretext of blight, ban 
such projects without exception.16 Florida, for example, not only bans 
all economic revitalization takings regardless of blight or a developer’s 
comprehensive development plan, but also bans all blight condemna-
tions in general.17 While such bans certainly remove the dangers of pa-
rochial favoritism towards corporate interests over local communities 
and insulate poor communities from takeover, they also come with a 
cost.18 Such bans hinder or prevent a state or municipality’s attempt to 
                                                                                                                      
12 See George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got to Do with It?, 17 
S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 803, 828–29 (2008); Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the 
Return to Blight and Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 177, 199–02 (2007). 
13 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 199–02, 205. 
14 See Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 828–29 (describing the regressivity of the blight stan-
dard); Goodin, supra note 12, at 200–02. 
15 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 199–02. 
16 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2138–39. 
17 See Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 833–35; Somin, supra note 1, at 2138–39. Florida’s 
strong condemnation of all economic development takings arose from an eminent domain 
battle over Riviera Beach, a predominantly black community on the ocean. See Lefcoe, 
supra note 12, at 833–35. Although it was in a prime location for beachside resorts, Riviera 
Beach was largely impoverished. See id. When the city attempted to use eminent domain to 
pursue a private developer’s economic redevelopment plan, a few residents challenged the 
taking, despite wide support of the plan by most of the affected residents and extremely 
high offers of compensation for displaced residents. See id. In the aftermath of this battle, 
Florida voters enacted a constitutional amendment requiring a three-fifths vote of both 
houses of the legislature to sanction a taking that transferred property from one private 
person to another. See id. 
18 See J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential Communities Under the Takings 
Clause, 23 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 131, 153–55 (2005); Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 831. 
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pursue desperately needed revitalization projects in poor areas.19 Al-
though the potential displacement of low-income, minority communi-
ties through private, corporate expansion is a real danger, it is equally 
dangerous to allow low-income neighborhoods to stagnate and devolve 
into slums because of a lack of economic opportunity.20 Private devel-
opment plays a critical role in uplifting depressed communities by pro-
viding direct public benefits including new jobs and affordable housing 
for residents, increased tax dollars for the municipality, increased 
property values, and improved facilities and public areas for the com-
munity.21 Furthermore, because local governments and states often do 
not have the funds to accomplish ambitious revitalization projects, al-
lowing private developers to assist in redevelopment projects can pre-
vent blighted areas from regressing into slums.22 
 For instance, the urban revitalization plan that led to the creation 
of the Inner Harbor in Baltimore stemmed from a public-private part-
nership with both direct purchases and eminent domain actions used 
to obtain waterfront land.23 To reverse the decline of property values 
and the flight of businesses from Baltimore, the city government and 
the business community in Baltimore worked together to revitalize Bal-
timore’s harbor into a thriving retail and entertainment district.24 The 
Inner Harbor development rejuvenated Baltimore and became a main 
tourist attraction, providing jobs for city dwellers and millions of dollars 
in tax revenue for the city.25 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 153–55; Timothy J. Dowling, How to Think About Kelo Af-
ter the Shouting Stops, in Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context 321, 330–31 
(Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 2006). 
20 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
21 See George E. Peterson & Dana R. Sundblad, The Conference Bd., Corpora-
tions as Partners in Strengthening Urban Communities 12 (1994); Byrne, supra note 
18, at 155–56; Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. Peterson & Sundblad give many examples 
of successful corporate-community partnerships that yielded tangible benefits to both the 
corporation and the urban community. See Peterson & Sundblad, supra, at 15–43. There 
are a wide variety of ways that corporations can invest in the economic improvement of 
poor communities and also earn a profit. See id. at 26 (describing Ben & Jerry’s unique 
approach to community development in which it franchises Ben & Jerry’s ice-cream shops 
to non-profits such as the Street Youth Center in San Francisco for free to use as job-
training facilities for people with few marketable skills). 
22 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 155–56; Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
23 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 155; Phillip A. Hummel, Student Article, East Side Story: 
The Redevelopment of East Baltimore, 15 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 97, 99 (2008). 
24 See Martin L. Millspaugh, The Inner Harbor Story, Urban Land, April 2003, at 36, 36–
37; Robert Sharoff, Redevelopment Enriching Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 
1997, § 9, at 5. 
25 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 155; Millspaugh, supra note 24, at 36. 
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 More recently, a public-private partnership between the City of Bal-
timore, the State of Maryland, and Johns Hopkins University has led to a 
proposed biotech center in the crime-ridden and economically de-
pressed “Middle East” neighborhood that surrounds Johns Hopkins 
University’s Medical School in East Baltimore.26 The proposed project 
will create two million square feet of biotech research facilities, 1,200 
units of mixed-income housing, retail space and public parks, and up to 
8,000 new jobs.27 Although this plan is not without opposition, the 
home replacement program and mixed-income housing project will 
allow many of the low-income residents to remain in their communities 
and will ensure fair accommodations and compensation for those who 
are displaced.28 Besides benefitting the city as a whole, the project will 
provide better transportation, public facilities, tax revenues, and job op-
portunities for the residents of the community and a resolution to the 
longstanding tension between the community and the University.29 
Maryland’s eminent domain laws, while relatively weak in protecting 
property owners against abusive private takings, still allow much needed 
revitalization projects like the East Baltimore biotech project.30 In states 
that completely ban takings for such projects, a few holdouts could eas-
ily derail development plans.31 Thus, overly restrictive eminent domain 
laws can do more harm than good by curtailing beneficial projects like 
the one in Baltimore.32 
                                                                                                                      
 
26 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 97–99; Eugene L. Meyer, Building a Technology Park in 
Baltimore by Rehabilitating a Neighborhood, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2008, at C7; see also discussion 
infra Part III. 
27 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 112. 
28 See id. at 120–22. 
29 See id. at 124–27; Meyer, supra note 26. 
30 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 108–12. 
31 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 155. 
32 See id.; Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31; Hummel, supra note 23, at 120–22. Dowling 
discusses various transformative economic revitalization projects in poor, distressed commu-
nities that came to fruition through private development and eminent domain authority. See 
Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. These include the corporate-driven Kansas Speedway revi-
talization project in Kansas City and the Nissan Motor Company manufacturing plant in 
Madison County, Mississippi, both of which provided tangible public benefits, including 
thousands of new jobs. See id. In addition to corporate-driven economic development, emi-
nent domain power is crucial to grassroots, non-profit redevelopment as well. See id. For in-
stance, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in Boston used eminent domain to pro-
vide affordable housing and revitalize decaying areas just a few blocks away from downtown 
Boston. See id. This initiative did not involve a corporate interest or private developer but 
instead was built from the ground up through neighborhood- and faith-based organizations 
including La Alianza Hispana, Casa Esperanza, and St. Patrick’s Church. See id. The “only 
feasible way to acquire land and promote neighborhood control of the project” was to use 
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 This Note argues that the best way to protect individuals from 
overly broad private takings while still allowing states and local govern-
ments to pursue legitimate revitalization projects is to define blight 
narrowly, to provide procedural hurdles for takings in private economic 
revitalization projects, and to provide enhanced compensation for dis-
placed residents (including renters).33 Additionally, including incen-
tives for community support for projects such as Community Benefits 
Agreements will benefit local communities by giving community groups 
a say in the final development agreements.34 Overall, such limitations 
will discourage abuses in which blight is used as a pretext, encourage 
serious planning by private developers, and provide just compensation 
for displaced communities.35 Part I gives a constitutional background 
of the public use doctrine and the implications of the Kelo opinion for 
minority communities. Part II focuses on the legislative response to Kelo 
and the problems with both the blight exception to private economic 
revitalization plans and the complete bans on such plans. Part III pro-
vides case examples of beneficial public-private development projects in 
depressed areas that provide tangible benefits for the city while also 
accounting for the needs of the poor living in those areas. Finally, Part 
IV proposes a few reforms that states should consider adopting in their 
eminent domain laws that would protect affected communities and 
prevent abuse while also encouraging much-needed economic devel-
opment. 
                                                                                                                      
eminent domain, and it is crucial to recognize that beneficial initiatives like this would be 
curtailed by strict bans on eminent domain for private development. See id. 
33 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 157–61, 162–63. 
34 See Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political Econ-
omy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1999, 2016 (2007); Jacqueline Leavitt, Linking 
Housing to Community Economic Development with Community Benefits Agreements: The Case of the 
Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice, in Jobs and Economic Development in Mi-
nority Communities 257, 265, 271 (Paul Ong & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds., 2006); 
Greg LeRoy, Community Benefit Agreements: A Strategy for Renewing Our Cities (Los Angeles, 
California), in Breakthrough Communities: Sustainability and Justice in the Next 
American Metropolis 205, 208–09 (M. Paloma Pavel ed., 2009). Leavitt defines Commu-
nity Benefits Agreements as “legally enforceable contracts that result from a negotiation 
process whereby a developer will provide certain benefits in return for a community 
group’s promise to support the project.” See Leavitt, supra, at 265. 
35 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 169. 
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I. Private Development Takings, Urban Renewal,  
and the Kelo Decision 
 The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides: “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”36 The 
Takings Clause applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
leaving states free to exercise eminent domain powers up to the consti-
tutional limit.37 The extent of this limit has generated much contro-
versy over the years.38 While takings to build roads, bridges, or railroads 
for actual “public use” are widely accepted, the question of whether a 
taking is for public use if it simply serves a “public purpose” has been 
more controversial.39 “Public purpose” takings could include transfer of 
private property from one citizen to another who will use the land 
more efficiently and thereby benefit more people.40 
 Despite the controversy surrounding “public purpose” takings, the 
Supreme Court’s line of precedent on the issue consistently demon-
strates that “public purpose” takings are constitutional.41 In Berman v. 
Parker, the Court unanimously approved the District of Columbia Rede-
velopment Act of 1945, which gave a redevelopment agency the author-
ity use eminent domain to take private property to redevelop blighted 
slums.42 After a property owner, whose department store was not 
blighted but was within the condemned redevelopment area, chal-
lenged the taking, the Court upheld the taking as constitutional.43 Rea-
soning that such takings met the “public purpose” requirement, the 
Court found that the takings were within the bounds of the Fifth 
Amendment.44 The Court extended this reasoning in Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, in which it found that a Hawaii state law that trans-
ferred private property from certain landowners to others was a consti-
tutional “public use.”45 Because only twenty-two landowners controlled 
more than seventy-two percent of the fee simple titles in Hawaii, the law 
allowed for wider public ownership of the land and therefore was con-
                                                                                                                      
36 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
37 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005). 
38 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232, 244 n. 7 (1984); Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 226 (1897). 
39 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954). 
40 See id. 
41 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
42 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 26. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. 
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stitutional even though the government itself never “used” the land.46 
The Kelo decision reinforced the constitutionality of “public purpose” 
takings.47 The opinion, while very much in line with Berman and Mid-
kiff, was very deferential to state “economic revitalization” plans and 
provided a strong base of authority for eminent domain takings.48 
 The Kelo case arose out of a development plan for economically 
depressed New London, Connecticut.49 New London hoped to partner 
with Pfizer to change its economic outlook through a comprehensive 
revitalization project.50 Pfizer and the state contributed much-needed 
funds for the project and the city’s development board created plans for 
a state park around Fort Trumbull, two marinas, a museum, a hotel and 
office building, eighty new condo units, and improved infrastructure 
and roads.51 Although the redevelopment area was not blighted, the city 
hoped to provide a much-needed infusion of jobs into New London as 
well as an increase in tax revenue.52 Susette Kelo, a long-time resident of 
New London whose home was inside the city’s redevelopment planning 
area, refused to sell her home to the city’s Development Committee.53 
When the city condemned the properties to prevent homeowners from 
blocking the plan, Kelo and the others challenged the taking as uncon-
stitutional.54 
 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court found that New 
London’s economic revitalization project constituted a “public use” in 
accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.55 Noting that 
the word “use” in the takings provision of the Fifth Amendment was 
meant to be interpreted broadly to mean public “purpose,” the Court 
found that if the local government could show a rational basis for con-
cluding that its development plan served a “public purpose,” the taking 
would be constitutional.56 In reaching its decision, the Court stressed 
the comprehensiveness of the plan that New London had adopted for 
the redevelopment project as evidence that the taking was not primarily 
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. 
47 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
48 See id. at 488–89. 
49 See id. at 473–75. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474–75. 
53 See id. at 475–76. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 489. 
56 See id. at 488–90. 
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perpetrated for Pfizer’s benefit.57 The Court also found that because 
economic development is well within the police power of the states and 
that the increase in property values, tax revenue, and jobs would serve 
the public interest, the project was a “public use.”58 Despite the absence 
of a finding that the condemned properties were blighted or a specific 
description of the role that Susette Kelo’s house would play in the re-
development plan, the Court deferred to the determination of the city 
and found it to be within the bounds of the constitution.59 
 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, advocated for a limit 
on the Court’s deference towards private “redevelopment” projects 
which merely favor corporate interests without providing any meaning-
ful public benefit.60 Noting the potential abuses of “economic revitali-
zation” projects under the Court’s hands-off approach, Kennedy ar-
gued that when faced with a “plausible accusation of impermissible fa-
voritism to private parties,” courts should scrutinize the project to see 
whether the transaction primarily benefits the developer with only “in-
cidental benefit to the city.”61 While this limitation could theoretically 
stop egregious takings intended to favor some private interest, a state or 
locality will very often be able to find a generalized “public purpose” 
behind a taking in practice.62 
 In a spirited dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the result of this 
opinion would disproportionately fall on poor, minority communities.63 
Harkening back to the “urban renewal” projects of the past, which 
some described as “negro removal” due to their effects on poor, pri-
                                                                                                                      
57 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489; Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 812. 
58 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–89. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
61 See id. 
62 See id. In one such example, the City of Lancaster, California attempted to use emi-
nent domain to condemn a 99 Cents Only Store to transfer property to the adjacent 
Costco, which threatened to move out of the area if it could not obtain more mall space. 
See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1123 
(C.D. Cal. 2001). The court found that this taking did not serve a public purpose because 
the only reason the city condemned the property was to satisfy the private expansion de-
mands of Costco and because the city’s claim that the taking was intended to prevent “fu-
ture blight” was unsupported by any authority or factual findings. See id. at 1129. Although 
the court in this case did not find public use, this case illustrates how local governments 
may abuse their eminent domain authority solely to benefit private developers and corpo-
rate interests and attempt to justify the taking by pointing to minimal incidental public 
benefits. See id.; David L. Callies, Phoenix Rising: The Rebirth of Public Use, in Eminent Do-
main Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context, supra note 19, at 49, 50–59 (describing various 
abuses of eminent domain authority for the benefit of private developers). 
63 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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marily black, communities, Thomas argued that the majority’s opinion 
would lead to similar results.64 Because the poor are less able to put 
their land to its most efficient use and are the least politically powerful, 
allowing states to transfer the lands and homes of poor citizens to cor-
porate interests for any plausible “revitalization” cause would be devas-
tating to these communities.65 
II. State Legislative Responses to Kelo 
 In response to the public outcry against Kelo, forty-three states 
changed their eminent domain laws to limit private development tak-
ings, some within weeks of the decision.66 While such eminent domain 
reforms were politically expedient, not many states completely curtailed 
private development takings like the one at issue in Kelo.67 For many 
states, the reform was simply symbolic and created no significant con-
straint on the ability of governments to pursue eminent domain actions 
to benefit private parties.68 A minority of states did pass meaningful 
eminent domain reforms that provide effective limits on economic de-
velopment takings, but did so at the cost of their ability to pursue eco-
nomic development projects.69 The trend in most states, however, was to 
use blight as the limiting factor in private economic development.70 
 The post-Kelo eminent domain limitations on private takings fall 
into three overall categories: (1) broadly defined “blight” limitations for 
private, economic development takings, (2) narrowly defined “blight” 
limitations for private economic development takings, and (3) complete 
prohibitions on private economic development takings.71 There are 
both positive and negative consequences for all three kinds of reform.72 
States that provide wide latitude for private economic development tak-
                                                                                                                      
64 See id.; Shelley Cashin, Race, Class, and Real Estate, in Breakthrough Communities: 
Sustainability and Justice in the Next American Metropolis, supra note 34, at 59, 61. 
65 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
66 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2101–02; 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Re-
form Legislation Since Kelo, Castle Coalition, 1 (Dec. 2008), http://www.castlecoalition.org/ 
pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf [hereinafter 50 State Report Card]. 
67 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2105. 
68 See id. For example, Connecticut’s new eminent domain law only prevents the con-
demnation of property “for the primary purpose of increasing local tax revenue.” See id. at 
2132–33. Because it is likely impossible to prove that a property is being condemned for 
the “primary purpose of increasing local tax revenue” instead of to promote economic 
development more generally, the law really has no effect. See id. 
69 See id. at 2138–43. 
70 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2138–43; Lovell, supra note 1, at 617–18. 
71 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 195–99. 
72 See id. 
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ings can stimulate sagging local economies and prevent areas from de-
generating into slums by providing tax breaks and municipal bond 
funding to private developers.73 Because the private developers also con-
tribute planning and funding for projects, redevelopment can be both 
efficient and cost-effective for a city.74 Nevertheless, such projects inevi-
tably affect low-income, minorities either by displacing them or by pric-
ing them out of the area.75 On the other hand, states that completely 
ban economic redevelopment takings suffer from the opposite prob-
lem.76 Because private developers cannot exercise eminent domain 
powers in these states, a few holdouts can derail private development 
projects completely or can engage in rent-seeking behavior that makes a 
development project unprofitable.77 Disallowing the use of eminent 
domain for private revitalization projects can deter much needed rede-
velopment and thus allow an area to degenerate into a slum.78 Finally, 
state laws that provide economic redevelopment takings in narrowly de-
fined “blighted” areas are effective in preventing overly lenient private 
takings such as Kelo but, without further restraints, will also dispropor-
tionately affect low-income, minority communities due to the fact that 
these communities are often characterized by the defining factors of 
blight.79 
                                                                                                                      
 
73 See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 657, 
681–84 (2007) (describing how local governments have turned to public-private partner-
ships with private developers to meet cities’ particular needs). 
74 See id. at 687; Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
75 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 153; Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
76 See Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 830–31 (noting that without eminent domain for pri-
vate economic development actions, development officials are convinced that worthwhile 
redevelopment projects will fail). Even though approximately eighty percent of state and 
federal government transactions of private property are voluntary, the threat of eminent 
domain may be necessary to prevent holdouts from blocking a transaction. See Marcilynn 
A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London, Babbitt v. Sweet Home, and 
Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 663, 716 (2006); Lefcoe, supra note 12, 
at 830–31. 
77 See Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 830–31. 
78 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 153–55 (noting that without eminent domain, urban re-
generation projects, such as the Inner Harbor in Baltimore, would be severely weakened); 
Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31; Terry Pristin, Developers Can’t Imagine a World Without 
Eminent Domain, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5. 
79 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 198, 202. There are problems with using an overly nar-
row definition of blight or requiring all properties within a given area to be blighted. See id. 
at 198–99. If, for example, revitalization planners choose to pursue projects in depressed 
areas that contain certain properties that do not meet the statutory definition of blight, 
they will be forced to pursue the project in an area that meets the definition, even if that 
area is not well-suited to the project. See id. A sensible solution to this type of scenario is to 
adopt a provision similar to Iowa’s—require a large percentage of properties in a given 
area to meet a narrow definition of blight and allow all properties within the area that are 
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A. The Broad “Blight-Limitation” Model 
 The most common legislative reform in the aftermath of Kelo was 
to tighten the definition of “public use” to exclude development pro-
jects aimed at increasing tax revenue.80 These reforms largely shifted 
the burden of private development takings onto poor, minority com-
munities by limiting private development actions to “blighted” areas.81 
Because the concept of “blight” is usually both malleable and broadly 
defined, this restriction alone provides very little substantive protection 
against Kelo-type takings and can be used to rationalize taking nearly 
any piece of property as part of an economic revitalization plan.82 The 
California legislature, for instance, enacted a series of five eminent 
domain reform bills in the aftermath of Kelo that used blight as a limit-
ing factor for economic redevelopment takings.83 Four of the five bills 
created minor procedural hurdles for local governments attempting to 
condemn property and one of the bills nominally narrowed the defini-
tion of “blight” for economic redevelopment purposes.84 These re-
forms are more symbolic than effective and will do little to stop emi-
nent domain takings in California that benefit private developers.85 For 
instance, California only requires that a property have one “physical 
condition” and one “economic condition” that satisfy the vague qualify-
ing criteria in the statute to be considered blight.86 Thus, in California 
and in many other states, local officials retain wide discretion in their 
implementation of the eminent domain statute, and can use “blight” as 
a pretense for nearly any taking.87 
                                                                                                                      
 
necessary and incidental to the project to be taken. See id. This will give planners flexibility 
in pursuing beneficial revitalization projects while protecting against corrupt or abusive 
takings. See id. 
80 See id. at 194–95. 
81 See id. at 199–202. 
82 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2114; Goodin, supra note 12, at 196–97. 
83 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2131–32. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. A high profile case in Lakewood, Ohio demonstrates the ease with which 
“blight” can be used to justify nearly any type of private redevelopment taking. See Rebecca 
Leung, Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, CBS News ( July 4, 2004), http://www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml. Under Ohio law, a municipality 
that qualifies as an “impacted city” is allowed to use eminent domain to pursue economic 
development benefitting private parties. See Christopher S. Brown, Comment, Blinded by the 
Blight: A Search for a Workable Definition of “Blight” in Ohio, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 207, 210 
(2004). Additionally, Ohio provides a broad definition of blight for purposes of redevel-
opment projects by “impacted cities” and municipalities are given wide latitude in deter-
mining what constitutes blight. See id. at 210–11. Using its wide latitude in defining blight, 
2011] Eminent Domain Six Years After Kelo 323 
 Although blight definitions like California’s make limitations on 
economic redevelopment condemnations essentially meaningless, in 
practice these blight condemnations overwhelmingly affect urban mi-
nority communities.88 It is not hard to understand why.89 Not only are 
low-income communities likely to meet any definition of “blight,” but 
there also are much stronger incentives for local governments and pri-
vate developers to condemn and redevelop in low-income areas than in 
higher income areas.90 The first major incentive is the low monetary 
cost of taking properties in depressed, urban communities compared to 
takings in more affluent areas.91 Because municipal governments are 
often low on funds and private developers want to maximize profits, ob-
taining property for redevelopment at a low cost is an ideal scenario.92 
Second, the political cost of condemning and redeveloping property in 
poor, minority communities is small compared to redevelopment pro-
jects in more affluent, white neighborhoods.93 Low-income minorities 
are often cut off from the political process and lack the political capital 
to influence elections.94 Given their overall marginalization, these 
communities can lack the ability to deter municipal governments and 
private developers from targeting their neighborhoods for condemna-
tion.95 
 The history of the controversial urban renewal projects of the mid-
twentieth century confirms that low-income, urban minorities (particu-
larly African Americans) faced disproportionate displacement in blight 
condemnations.96 With the passage of the Housing Acts of 1949 and 
1954, urban renewal programs symbolized “progress” for American cit-
ies and became the primary means for municipal governments to com-
bat the dispersal of middle and upper class families and businesses 
                                                                                                                      
the City of Lakewood sought to condemn many single-family properties in the quiet and 
scenic town to transfer to developers, who intended to build expensive condominiums in 
their place. See Leung, supra. What the city considered blight for condemnation purposes 
was almost comical—a home could be considered blighted if it didn’t have three bed-
rooms, two baths, a two-car garage, and central air. See id. Although the proposed devel-
opment project eventually failed due to widespread public outcry, broad “blight” defini-
tions like Ohio’s potentially allow takings like this to occur. See id. 
88 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 200–02. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 202–04. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 16 (2003). 
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from the cities into outlying suburbs.97 The new jobs and new tech-
nologies that resulted from urban renewal projects meant more reve-
nue for city governments and downtown businesses—but standing in 
the way were the poor, urban communities that kept the city 
“blighted.”98 The rhetorical use of the term “blight” to refer to inner-
city slums deliberately evokes the image of a disease that should be iso-
lated and eradicated.99 The goal of saving America’s downtowns from 
the “diseased neighborhoods” came at the overwhelming expense of 
the poor, most of whom were African American.100 The upheaval and 
displacement of black neighborhoods due to urban renewal programs 
not only uprooted people from their homes and communities but also 
devastated their sense of belonging in the nation.101 Many of the same 
problems are inherent in broad, blight-centered eminent domain au-
thority for economic revitalization projects that lack further protections 
for poor communities against pre-textual takings.102 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880–1950, at 318 (2001); 
Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods 
Hurts America, and What We Can Do About It 57–59, 74–75 (2005). Fullilove describes 
four decades of upheaval after urban renewal in what was once a vibrant and thriving black 
community in beautiful Roanoke, Virginia. See Fullilove, supra, at 57–59, 74–75. The re-
newal effort was based on a declaration of “blight” that was pre-textual, exaggerated, and 
racist—the white power structure championed the destruction of the community in favor of 
“better uses” for the land. See id. 
98 See Fogelson, supra note 97, at 318–19, 349; Fullilove, supra note 97, at 57. To be 
sure, many city neighborhoods were legitimately dangerous and were both unsanitary and 
unfit for human habitation. See Fogelson, supra note 97, at 318–19. For instance, the fil-
thy, crowded, and dilapidated tenement houses on the Lower East Side of New York, which 
housed poor immigrants, would meet any definition of blight. See id. The problem with the 
concept of blight, however, was that proponents of urban renewal did not restrict them-
selves to redeveloping slum areas that posed a danger to the health and safety of their 
residents. See id. Instead, downtown business interests and their allies were able to pressure 
local officials to declare neighborhoods surrounding central business districts as “blighted” 
even if they were not slums. See id. at 365. 
99 See Fogelson, supra note 97, at 349. 
100 See David Fleming, City of Rhetoric: Revitalizing the Public Sphere in Met-
ropolitan America 77–79 (2008); Fullilove, supra note 97, at 57–59, 166–67. 
101 See Fullilove, supra note 97, at 166–67. 
102 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 152–53. Byrne notes, however, that there are protections 
in place today, such as the Fair Housing Act and informed consent provisions in some states 
that allow low-income residents of cities to fight against racist or pre-textual takings. See id. at 
152–55. 
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B. Narrow Definition of Blight Model 
A few states such as Iowa and Indiana also use blight as the limitation 
for private economic development takings.103 Unlike the majority of 
state reforms, however, these states provide a much narrower definition 
of blight.104 The benefit of limiting economic development takings to 
narrowly defined “blighted” properties is that it protects against private-
benefit economic development takings like the one at issue in Kelo.105 
Under this type of system, states and municipalities can no longer rely 
on a vague “public use” justification for taking private property or use a 
conveniently broad definition of “blight” as a pretext for such a tak-
ing.106 Instead, the parcel to be taken (or the majority of properties 
within the taking area) must actually satisfy the specific criteria in the 
statute in order to for private property to be taken for a redevelopment 
project.107 For instance, Indiana only finds blight if the area is “a public 
nuisance, is unfit for habitation, does not meet the building code, is a 
fire hazard, or is otherwise dangerous.”108 Thus, using a narrow defini-
tion of blight puts a meaningful check on a government’s power of 
eminent domain while also allowing flexibility for needed redevelop-
ment projects.109 
 The downside of the narrow definition of blight is that without 
further statutory protections, it strengthens the already disproportion-
ate targeting of low-income communities for private redevelopment.110 
Just like the urban renewal programs of the past that used “blight” as an 
excuse to raze minority communities, today’s “economic revitalization” 
projects can be similarly destructive, even with a narrow definition of 
blight.111 Thus, more provisions are needed to ensure that communi-
ties targeted for revitalization receive fair treatment, have a voice in the 
planning efforts, receive just compensation, and receive adequate and 
affordable housing in the aftermath of the project.112 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 198–99; 50 State Report Card, supra note 66, at 18–19. 
104 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 198–99. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 32-24-4.5-7 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) (forbidding 
most private-to-private condemnations and restricting the definition of blight); Iowa Code 
§ 6A.22 (2008); supra note 79. 
108 See § 32-24-4.5-7. 
109 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 198–99. 
110 See id. at 202. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
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C. Complete Ban 
 Finally, a minority of states completely restricted private develop-
ment takings for the benefit of private parties.113 Florida, for instance, 
bans all eminent domain actions to relieve blight and requires munici-
palities to wait ten years before transferring taken private property to 
another private owner or developer.114 Florida is now considered the 
model for effective eminent domain reform because it neutralizes any 
threat of abusive or pre-textual takings.115 Similarly, Georgia countered 
the Kelo decision by explicitly stating that economic development is not 
a valid public use that justifies an eminent domain action.116 
 Although such bans effectively prevent the exploitation and dis-
placement of low-income minority communities inherent in private 
economic redevelopment takings, they also come with a major cost— 
they give local governments no flexibility in pursuing projects that could 
boost not only the city as a whole, but also the affected neighbor-
hoods.117 The specter of abusive takings is certainly real and local gov-
ernments often do not act in the best interests of the communities.118 
Nevertheless, completely banning private economic redevelopment is a 
harmful overreaction to the problem because corporations and busi-
nesses are very important players in the health of a city and the 
neighborhood where they are located.119 Local governments, in order 
                                                                                                                      
 
113 See Somin, supra note 1, at 2138–42. 
114 See Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to 
Kelo, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 237, 241 (2009). 
115 See id. 
116 See 50 State Report Card, supra note 66, at 14. 
117 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31; Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 830–31; LeRoy, supra 
note 34, at 208. 
118 See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Im-
permissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173, 178–80 (2009) (noting that allowing 
unlimited private involvement in the eminent domain process raises a number of concerns 
including corruption, inordinate influence, and conflicts with the public interest). Kelly 
also notes that there is a definite possibility in private economic development takings that 
“private parties threaten to relocate unless the local government condemns on their be-
half.” See id. 
119 See Peterson & Sundblad, supra note 21, at 12–14; Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 830–
31. While there are risks involved for corporations that choose to get involved in reinvest-
ment projects, corporate involvement in the health of adjacent communities can in fact 
benefit both parties by decreasing crime, increasing property values, promoting an edu-
cated population, and improving physical conditions. See Peterson & Sundblad, supra 
note 21, at 12–14. Corporations can choose different strategies and levels of involvement 
in community development, including direct involvement, community partnership around 
a business core, or reaching communities through intermediary institutions. See id. Re-
gardless of the level of involvement, however, profit maximization and community-building 
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to improve the economic health of their communities, often rely upon 
private developers for much-needed funding and planning for major 
urban revitalization projects.120 Despite the fear of corporate favoritism 
or slum clearance, private and corporate redevelopment can play an 
important role in turning distressed communities into healthy neighbor-
hoods.121 Because a local government’s most fundamental role is to pro-
tect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, revitalizing dilapidated, 
run-down, economically depressed areas is thus part of a local govern-
ment’s basic duties.122 If a private developer collaborates with a local 
community to provide an efficient, well-planned, and socially just eco-
nomic redevelopment project for a depressed area, then the entire city 
can reap the benefits.123 
 Eminent domain plays a very important role in beneficial redevel-
opment projects.124 Many public-private development projects are large 
in scale and require a lot of land to be implemented effectively.125 Be-
cause a single property owner can derail even small-scale development 
projects, eminent domain takings become crucial for the success of 
large projects.126 Not only would a property owner’s veto over a devel-
opment project lead to inefficient results, but it could also hinder a lo-
cal government’s efforts to renew and rebuild economically depressed 
                                                                                                                      
are completely compatible if a corporation acts in a way that the community supports. See 
id. 
120 See Sean Zielenbach, The Art of Revitalization: Improving Conditions in Dis-
tressed Inner-City Neighborhoods 249 (2000); Blais, supra note 73, at 681–83. Zielen-
bach notes the importance of a variety of actors in the successful revitalization of a depressed 
neighborhood, particularly community organizations, local governments, local businesses, 
and churches. See Zielenbach, supra, at 223. He also notes that while corporate-driven, 
“trickle-down” economic growth may revitalize a downtown, it has not proved to be a panacea 
for the lowest-income residents. See id. at 226. Nevertheless, bottom-up community develop-
ment can be very effective in revitalizing an area, particularly when community organizations 
collaborate with large institutions and corporations in the revitalization planning. See Alex-
ander Von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block: The Rebirth of America’s Ur-
ban Neighborhoods 158 (2003). 
121 See Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris & Paul Ong, Lessons for Community Economic Develop-
ment, in Jobs and Economic Development in Minority Communities, supra note 34, at 
295, 298. 
122 See Pritchett, supra note 96, at 45–46. 
123 See Von Hoffman, supra note 120, at 158 (noting the importance of large institu-
tions and local governments in successful community redevelopment programs). 
124 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
125 See Blais, supra note 73, at 681–83; Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
126 See Blais, supra note 73, at 683–84. Without the ability to use eminent domain, a 
single holdout can veto the entire project or coerce the developer to pay much more than 
necessary to acquire the land. See id. 
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areas.127 Indeed, for some cities, “spot revitalization,” in which a city or 
developer strategically buys and rehabilitates or develops property sur-
rounding a blighted area with the hope of catalyzing reinvestment in 
the area, is not an effective solution.128 Thus, a state is severely limiting 
a local or municipal government’s ability to revitalize blighted areas by 
banning private economic revitalization projects.129 
III. Economic Revitalization and Eminent Domain: Case Studies 
 Because eminent domain plays such an important role in urban 
planning and redevelopment, states should calibrate their laws to allow 
for private takings that are part of a comprehensive, community-sup-
ported redevelopment plan in depressed areas.130 At the same time, 
these laws must also prevent the transfer of private property simply in 
services of an economically “better use.”131 In order to fully appreciate 
                                                                                                                      
 
127 See Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 830–31. 
128 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 115–16 (describing the failure of Baltimore and 
Johns Hopkins to revitalize the Middle East neighborhood through spot revitalization). 
129 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31; Lefcoe, supra note 12, at 830–31. Newark, 
New Jersey provides an example of how states and cities can use economic revitalization 
projects to rejuvenate their poorest and most depressed cities. See Rafael Zabala, Enterprise 
Renaissance Revitalizes Newark, N.J., 10 F. for Applied Res. & Pub. Pol’y 112, 115 (1995). In 
1983, New Jersey passed the Urban Enterprise Zone Act, which authorized tax incentives 
for businesses to move back into cities and facilitated targeted investment in poor areas. See 
id. at 112–13. Newark chose the Newark Economic Development Corporation (NEDC) to 
manage its “enterprise zone” and revitalize the city. See id. Through cooperation with cor-
porations as well as with the city, the state, and community organizations, the NEDC was 
able to generate more than $5 billion in economic development activities and helped se-
cure local benefits, including a number of programs to benefit local businesses, provide 
employment training for residents, and rebuild existing houses and commercial structures. 
See id. The enterprise zone program also gave city residents the opportunity to purchase 
taxable goods from businesses at a fifty percent discount, with the rest of the sales tax pro-
ceeds going to economic development and public improvement programs in the city, in-
cluding an around-the-clock police unit. See id. at 114. New Jersey’s Urban Enterprise Zone 
program and the work of the NEDC proved to be a huge success in Newark, not only by 
bringing in companies and building up commercial corridors, but also by creating thou-
sands of permanent jobs for residents along with thousands of refurbished affordable 
housing units. See id. at 115. For a city that during the 1980s had an unemployment rate 
that was twice the national average, an average per capita income that was half the nation’s 
average, and a soaring foreclosure and vacancy rate, the redevelopment program was a 
veritable urban renaissance. See id. 
130 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. 
131 See id. Finding this balance is not easy; therefore takings for economic revitalization 
projects require strict limitations and procedures. See id. As noted by Justice O’Connor in 
her dissent in Kelo, nearly any redevelopment project can claim to be for a “public use” 
because it may have some secondary benefits to the public such as increased tax revenue, 
more jobs, and maybe even aesthetic pleasure. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 502 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). For instance, the planners and officials in New 
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the correct balance needed in eminent domain laws, it is important to 
see how private redevelopment can be used to uplift rather than destroy 
poor communities.132 The following case examples demonstrate that 
corporate interests can align with community interests in urban revitali-
zation projects and provide tangible benefits for neighborhoods and 
entire cities.133 
A. The East Baltimore Development Project—Using Economic Redevelopment 
and Eminent Domain to Transform a Neighborhood 
With Johns Hopkins buying up everything north of Monument Street and 
tearing the shit down, I think we all see the writing on the wall in East Bal-
timore. 
—Proposition Joe134 
                                                                                                                      
 
London truly felt that Pfizer’s proposed research facility and development plan would 
revitalize the city’s crumbling infrastructure and sagging economy and therefore benefit 
the city as a whole. See Editorial, A Turning Point for Eminent Domain?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 
2009, 6:36 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/a-turning-point-
for-eminent-domain. Unfortunately, they were wrong and homes and families were dis-
placed for nothing. See Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer and 1,400 Jobs to Leave City That Won Land-
Use Suit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2009, at A1. States should set meaningful limits on taking 
authority for private development projects to prevent situations such as this, in which pri-
vate property and especially poor communities are sacrificed with no other justification 
except vague promises of a greater good. See infra Part IV. 
132 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 301. 
133 See Peterson & Sundblad, supra note 21, at 12–14; Thomas D. Boston, The Role of 
the Black-Owned Businesses in Black Community Development, in Jobs and Economic Devel-
opment in Minority Communities, supra note 34, at 161, 168–71. The recent history of 
urban revitalization in Oakland, California demonstrates how economic revitalization pro-
jects can integrate local community members in the planning. See Alex Salazar, Designing a 
Socially Just Downtown, Nat’l Housing Inst. (2006), http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/ 
145/designingdowntown.html. In 2003, Oakland mayor Jerry Brown attempted to reverse 
the city’s downward spiral into “slumification” through an ambitious economic revitaliza-
tion project in Oakland’s “Westside,” including its downtown area. See id. Unfortunately, 
the plan centered on the development of high-priced condominium units and, while it 
would be successful in gentrifying parts of the city, it would disproportionately displace 
many low-income residents. See id. To prevent this scenario, local housing rights activists 
and members of the affected communities were able to convince the private developer of 
the financial viability of building mixed-income housing on less desirable parcels within 
the development area by pressuring the city to provide a tax credit to the developer for 
these buildings. See id. The end result of the grassroots housing advocacy by members of 
the community was the inclusion of affordable, mixed-income housing as part of the rede-
velopment area. See id. This project’s success highlights the importance of community in-
volvement in any economic revitalization project. See id. 
134 See The Wire: More With Less (HBO television broadcast Jan. 6, 2008). Proposition 
Joe, a fictional East Baltimore drug kingpin in the critically acclaimed HBO series The Wire, 
discussed “the writing on the wall in East Baltimore” at a co-operative meeting of drug 
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 Eminent domain takings used to promote economic development 
are a critical tool of state and local governments and sometimes the 
only effective means to revitalize a depressed, crime-ridden area.135 The 
ambitious East Baltimore Development Initiative (EBDI) biotech pro-
ject, spearheaded by the City of Baltimore and Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, demonstrates both the desperate need for some economic revitali-
zation projects and how they can be used to breathe new life into a 
poor and hopeless neighborhood.136 
 Johns Hopkins University, one of the premier research and medi-
cal institutions in the nation, is only blocks away from a collection of 
the most desperately poor and violent neighborhoods in Baltimore, 
ironically known as the “Middle East.”137 Long-standing tension has ex-
isted between the university and the residents of the Middle East 
neighborhoods, both because of Hopkins’ expansions into Middle East 
territory and because of crimes committed against Johns Hopkins’ stu-
dents and faculty by Middle East residents.138 The University, the City of 
Baltimore, and even the federal government made various attempts to 
revitalize the Middle East neighborhood through rebuilding individual 
buildings and blocks with the hope that the rebuilding process would 
attract new investment and uplift the neighborhood.139 For instance, in 
1994, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
designated the Middle East neighborhoods as an “empowerment zone” 
                                                                                                                      
dealers. See id. In response to his lamentation over lost drug territory, another drug dealer 
replied: “Yeah, they movin’ the hood out.” See id. This fictional scene encapsulates the 
actual tension between Johns Hopkins University and the surrounding East Baltimore 
neighborhoods, which are notorious for a violent drug trade. See Hummel, supra note 23, 
at 97; Stephen Kiehl, Seeds of Renewal in Oliver, Balt. Sun, May 7, 2008, at B1. Given the 
history between the neighborhood and the university and the many failed attempts at 
“spot revitalization,” the university and the city decided to pursue a much more ambitious 
approach to redevelopment—the East Baltimore Development Initiative (EBDI), centered 
around the biotech industry. See Hummel, supra note 23, at 117. 
135 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–31. One amicus brief in Kelo noted that “by creat-
ing job opportunities for local residents, such [economic revitalization] projects attack 
what may well be the single greatest contributor to urban misery.” See Brief Amici Curiae of 
Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Dev., et al. in Support of Respondents at 11, Kelo, 
545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108). 
136 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 117; Stephen Kiehl, Life Science Cornerstone Opens in 
East Baltimore, Balt. Sun, Apr. 11, 2008, at B1. 
137 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 97. 
138 See id. Residents who lived near the Hopkins complex referred to it as “the com-
pound” and its leaders as “vampires” because of Hopkins’ spread across the neighborhood. 
See id. The leaders of Hopkins equally distrusted the residents of the neighborhood, par-
ticularly after a Hopkins medical student was raped and a medical school professor was 
attacked in her own office. See id. 
139 See id. at 97, 114–15. 
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and allocated $250 million to “catalyze reinvestment in these decaying 
neighborhoods.”140 The Historic East Baltimore Community Action 
Coalition (HEBCAC) was tasked with the responsibility of coordinating 
and implementing the rehabilitation program in East Baltimore and 
chose to implement its agenda by strategically rehabilitating blighted 
houses in the neighborhood.141 These new homes were then sold to 
residents of the neighborhood in exchange for the residents’ deterio-
rating homes.142 Despite their efforts, however, HEBCAC’s revitaliza-
tion project did not produce the results it intended.143 Despite the pro-
ject’s spiraling costs and increasing debt, the number of vacant proper-
ties in the area doubled by the year 2000.144 
                                                                                                                     
 Instead of accepting the status quo and leaving the neighborhood 
to sink deeper into violence and disrepair, however, Johns Hopkins and 
the City of Baltimore developed a much more ambitious plan to change 
the nature and health of the Middle East neighborhoods.145 The plan 
centered on the Life Sciences industry, given Johns Hopkins’ status as 
one of the premier medical research institutions in the nation; the 
eighty-eight acre, ten- to fifteen-year development would result in two 
million square feet of biotech research space, up to 100,000 square feet 
of retail and commercial space, up to 8,000 new jobs, and more than 
2,000 units of new and rehabilitated mixed income housing.146 The plan 
also included new parks, playgrounds, and gardens, a brand new public 
 
140 See id. at 115. As of 2004, the crime rate in East Baltimore was double that of the 
rest of the city, which at the time had one of the highest crime rates in the nation. See E. 
Baltimore Dev. Inc., The East Baltimore Revitalization Initiative, Annie E. Casey Found. 
(Sept. 2007), http://www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/CivicSites/~/media/PDFFiles/East_ 
Balti_Summary.pdf. More than one-third of families in East Baltimore had incomes below 
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school for East Baltimore children from kindergarten to the eighth 
grade, and an infusion of new retail businesses ranging from retail stores 
to dry cleaners to coffee shops.147 Johns Hopkins University, the City of 
Baltimore, the State of Maryland, the Federal Government, and a num-
ber of private financial partners, foundations, community groups, and 
non-profits formed a public-private partnership to develop and imple-
ment this plan.148 This partnership led to the creation of the East Balti-
more Development Initiative (EBDI), a non-profit organization tasked 
with overseeing the entire ten- to fifteen-year project.149 In the words of 
the former mayor of Baltimore, the EBDI project would be a chance to 
“rebuild a neighborhood from the ground up.”150 
 What has kept this project from resembling the “urban renewal” 
projects of the past is community collaboration and accommodation— 
EBDI both listened to and integrated community concerns in its devel-
opment process and has “tak[en] pains to accommodate the people 
who were there before all the building began.”151 Middle East neighbor-
hood groups including the Oliver Community Association and the 
Collington Square Neighborhood Association partnered with the de-
velopment initiative and community representatives have seats on 
EBDI’s board of directors, thereby guaranteeing the neighborhood a 
voice in the planning.152 To allay fears of abusive displacement, for in-
stance, EBDI has offered progressive relocation assistance that allows 
residents of East Baltimore who are displaced in the redevelopment 
project to improve their social and economic situations and secure the 
ability to be included in the revitalized community.153 This relocation 
assistance for displaced residents provides different types of aid 
throughout the project and includes monetary compensation for the 
fair market value of the property, replacement housing payments for 
property owners, up to three and one-half years rent for displaced ten-
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ants, legal and social support services, and moving expenses.154 Addi-
tional funds contributed by Johns Hopkins and the Casey Foundation 
provide supplemental benefits for displaced residents that include con-
tinued social service support after the moving process is complete, 
eighteen additional months of rental assistance, and augment federal 
assistance for homeowners by up to $70,000.155 The program has al-
ready had an impact—as of 2007, 396 households were relocated with 
the right to return to the neighborhood in brand new housing units.156 
Additionally, thirty-nine of the fifty-six new senior apartments and 
twenty-four of the forty-two new workforce apartments were claimed by 
East Baltimore residents.157 
 Furthermore, EBDI required a set amount of on-site jobs to be 
filled by East Baltimore residents, thereby ensuring that the neighbor-
hood will directly benefit from the influx of companies and retailers.158 
EBDI’s development project is still ongoing but residents and local firms 
have already benefitted from the development.159 For instance, more 
than thirty-five percent of all project contracts were awarded to women, 
minorities, and local firms and local residents were connected to more 
than fifty-five percent of the on-site jobs.160 Though the project is far 
from being completed, a number of blocks in the neighborhood have 
already undergone transformation and better housing and new job op-
portunities have moved in.161 Overall, most residents of the redeveloped 
East Baltimore neighborhoods have welcomed the positive changes 
stemming from the project including the improved safety, increased job 
opportunities and training, new and improved housing, and progressive 
relocation assistance.162 While it is still too early to determine how resi-
dents will be fully integrated into the “economic engine” of the com-
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pleted biopark project, overall, the redevelopment effort has given sig-
nificant hope to a once desperately poor and violent neighborhood.163 
B. Community Benefits Agreements in Los Angeles—Ending the Enmity 
Between Business and Community 
If they don’t comply with even one portion of the agreement then the whole 
thing is void. 
—Victor Narro164 
 Not only are private economic redevelopment plans often the 
most effective way of revitalizing a depressed neighborhood, but com-
munity partnerships made with private developers are also the most 
cost-effective way for a city or municipality to fund projects that other-
wise would not happen and that directly benefit local communities.165 
Aid to local governments has been one of the largest victims of state 
budget cuts in recent years and the federal government has cut its 
funding to cities as well.166 For this reason, cities and local governments 
often depend heavily on corporations and private developers as the 
source of funding for much-needed economic development projects.167 
While tight budgets and local economic stagnation have often influ-
enced local and city officials into favoring corporate interests at the ex-
pense of affected communities, this does not have to be the case.168 In 
fact, through procurement and development rules, cities can use cor-
porate-sponsored projects not only to promote smart growth, curb 
sprawl, and promote economic development, but also to provide tangi-
ble benefits to local communities.169 The greatest tool that local and 
city governments can use to accomplish these goals, and that communi-
ties can use to get a voice in redevelopment projects, are community 
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benefits agreements (CBAs), which are “legally enforceable contracts 
that result from a negotiation process whereby a developer will provide 
certain benefits in return for a community group’s promise to support 
the project.”170 Across the nation, grassroots “Davids” are able to use 
CBAs in order to negotiate with developer “Goliaths” and gain tangible 
community benefits including the creation of living-wage jobs, afford-
able housing, and local hiring requirements.171 
 In Los Angeles, community groups and neighborhood organiza-
tions used CBAs to secure community needs during the expansion of 
both the downtown Staples Center and the Los Angeles airport.172 The 
history of community organization and negotiation in the Staples Cen-
ter project in particular demonstrates how CBAs can be used to prevent 
abusive displacement by private developers in economic revitalization 
projects.173 The Figueroa Corridor in Los Angeles covers a forty-block 
area between the University of Southern California and the Staples Cen-
ter, with Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard to the south, Eighth Street to 
the north, Western Avenue to the west, and Alameda Street to the 
east.174 Figueroa Street is a major corridor in Los Angeles, but also in-
cludes older residential neighborhoods and one of the poorest areas in 
the city known as Skid Row.175 Anschutz Entertainment Group, the de-
veloper and owner of the Staples Center, sought to expand into the sur-
rounding Figueroa community to make way for a sports and entertain-
ment district.176 The plan was to build two hotels and several condo-
miniums, along with 1.1 million gross square feet for retail, entertain-
ment, office, and residential uses.177 Unfortunately, the sports and 
entertainment district would also displace many in the community and 
drive out local businesses.178 Even worse for those in the community, the 
Staples Center development and its resulting gentrification would cause 
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housing prices to skyrocket.179 Local landlords would cash in on the 
dramatic rise in housing prices by threatening evictions in order to raise 
prices or by converting single-room occupancies in nearby Skid Row to 
upscale housing.180 
 The residents of the Figueroa Corridor community felt very uneasy 
about the upcoming development, fearing mass evictions, price in-
creases, and job losses.181 Fortunately for the community, its residents 
were well-organized and its community groups had won victories for 
low-income members in the past.182 To face this latest challenge, the 
Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) worked with 
other groups, including the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy 
and Strategic Action for a Just Economy, to develop a consolidated 
strategy to ensure that community voices were heard and needs were 
met.183 As a result, the FCCEJ was able to enter into formal negotiations 
with both the developer and the city.184 Through strong negotiations 
resulting in a legally binding CBA, the FCCEJ secured a number of di-
rect benefits for the community from the private developer, which were 
integrated into and buttressed by the city’s own agreement with the de-
veloper.185 The provisions of the agreement include local hiring re-
quirements, living wage and unionized job benchmarks, minimum re-
quirements for affordable housing for low-income individuals, provi-
sions for developer-funded parks and recreation facilities for the com-
munity, environmental planning agreements, and preferential parking 
for local residents.186 
 Thus, CBAs have brought about a “fundamental change” in the 
dynamics of development by giving residents a voice in shaping the fu-
ture of their communities.187 Through the use of CBAs, neighborhood 
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stakeholders are able to sit directly across the table from developers 
and ensure that their needs are addressed and integrated into devel-
opment plans.188 Furthermore, CBAs are also beneficial for cities be-
cause they provide a way to fund otherwise unaffordable projects and 
services while also ensuring that the projects directly serve their con-
stituents’ needs.189 While a CBA is only one tool to use in private eco-
nomic revitalization projects, CBAs can be a very potent way to link 
community needs to private economic development.190 
IV. Finding the Middle Ground in Eminent Domain Reform 
 Eminent domain allows state and local governments to correct 
market failure and promote the welfare of citizens, but it can also lead 
to corruption and land grabbing.191 Private redevelopment projects, 
although ostensibly done in the name of “economic revitalization” with 
real public benefits, are often little more than patronage to big box re-
tailers or major corporations.192 Thus, without strong and substantive 
limits on eminent domain, city and local governments easily capitulate 
to private demands without regard to the communities they are affect-
ing.193 For this reason, state eminent domain laws must walk a fine line 
between being too beholden to private interests and being too strict 
and narrow, thereby curtailing private redevelopment plans that would 
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stimulate economically depressed communities.194 While there is cer-
tainly no uniform solution to eminent domain reform and economic 
revitalization projects in general, there are a number of steps state legis-
latures can take to ensure that private economic revitalization takings 
are both fair and provide direct public benefits.195 
 First, states should require a finding that a property satisfies strictly 
defined criteria before it can be condemned and before any develop-
ment plan can begin.196 Such a limitation would prevent states from 
flippantly condemning private property to satisfy a business or corpo-
rate developer and then justifying the condemnation post hoc through 
a broadly conceived notion of blight.197 The primary argument against 
using blight as a limit on condemnations is that it shifts the burden of 
eminent domain takings to poor communities that already are dispro-
portionately affected by these takings.198 Completely banning blight or 
economic redevelopment condemnations, however, prevents states and 
local governments from fulfilling their most fundamental duty— pro-
tecting and preserving the health, safety, and welfare of citizens.199 
 How to define blight is a thorny issue that has confounded legisla-
tures and city planners for decades.200 While it is overly simplistic to ex-
pect to have a simple definition that encapsulates the complex and fluid 
state of neighborhoods, states can set meaningful limits on the definition 
of blight to prevent it from being completely open-ended.201 Factors of-
ten included in statutory definitions of blight such as “age,” “inadequate 
planning,” “incompatible land use,” and “dilapidated buildings” are 
overly vague and are not necessarily indicative of the true nature of a 
given neighborhood.202 Factors that should be included in a definition 
of blight are those which demonstrate that a property poses a danger to 
the health, safety, and welfare of the community.203 Good examples of 
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narrow “blight” definitions include statutes like those in Iowa and Indi-
ana, which limit abusive takings while still allowing eminent domain to 
be used in depressed areas that need redevelopment.204 Overall, by codi-
fying a narrow definition of blight for purposes of eminent domain, city 
planners and private developers will be restrained from using eminent 
domain abusively but economic revitalization projects will occur in areas 
that are in desperate need.205 
 Second, procedural requirements should be built into eminent 
domain laws to ensure that before economic revitalization takings occur, 
residents are not only able to receive fair compensation for the loss of 
their housing, but also are able to play a role in the development plan 
for their communities.206 One aspect of the Kelo opinion that states 
could codify into their eminent domain laws is to require a comprehen-
sive redevelopment plan with strict requirements that must be met be-
fore any taking is approved.207 To ensure the redevelopment plan is 
necessary and benefits the community, states could codify a judicial re-
view provision whereby governments are precluded from condemning 
any private property to transfer to another private party unless there is a 
showing: (1) that the project has “substantial and direct public uses and 
benefits,” (2) that acquiring the property was “necessary to accomplish 
the comprehensive redevelopment plan,” and (3) that displaced parties 
are included or have an opportunity to be included in the project.208 
Before any condemnation, states should also require that the redevel-
opment planning processes be open to public input, with public hear-
ings and state-funded technical assistance to facilitate participation.209 
Any significant changes to the project or underlying justification by the 
developer should be subject to judicial review.210 Such requirements 
would prevent pre-textual, abusive takings and would allow for greater 
community participation in economic redevelopment plans.211 
                                                                                                                      
given area. See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330; Goodin, supra note 12, at 198–99. A sensible, 
middle-ground approach is to require a minimum threshold of “blighted” properties in a 
given development area before a taking can occur and to require every other property in the 
redevelopment area to be “reasonably necessary” for the overall project. See Goodin, supra 
note 12, at 198–99. 
204 See Goodin, supra note 12, at 198–99. 
205 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 332–33. 
206 See id. 
207 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–85 (2005); Dowling, supra note 
19, at 332–33. 
208 See Hummel, supra note 23, at 110–11. 
209 See Dowling, supra note 19, at 330–32. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. at 330–34. 
340 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:311 
 Third, states should provide displaced residents with enhanced 
compensation, above fair market value.212 Because the fair market 
value of housing in distressed areas is quite low, setting the compensa-
tion figure at a premium will provide some restitution of the non-
economic value of the property to displaced residents.213 This premium 
could be calculated based on the value of the land’s highest and best 
use or by the value of the property to the receiving entity, thereby giv-
ing the resident some of the increased value of the property that will 
result from the economic revitalization project.214 Increased relocation 
benefits could also be a part of a state’s just compensation laws.215 
When the federal government exercises its power of eminent domain, 
displaced residents and businesses receive compensation in the form of 
moving expenses, dislocation allowances, and other incidental ex-
penses.216 Such federal benefits do not apply to state, local, or private 
redevelopment projects, and therefore do not protect all those who 
may be displaced by a taking.217 States could compensate such indi-
viduals by enacting additional compensation provisions like Maryland’s, 
which would cover displaced residents’ moving expenses and provide 
them allowances to rent, lease, or purchase comparable housing.218 
Additionally, to preserve communities and limit displacement, local 
governments should be encouraged to offer condemnees an opportu-
nity to acquire new homes or housing units in the revitalized area so 
that they can retain their ties to the neighborhood.219 
                                                                                                                     
 Finally, state legislatures should include provisions in their laws 
that provide incentives for local governments and developers to inte-
grate community planning and local benefits into their redevelopment 
strategies.220 These provisions could include tax incentives for busi-
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nesses to hire local residents within a redevelopment area or tax credits 
for investors to invest in small businesses within the area.221 
 For any renewal effort to be successful, there must be strong com-
munity leadership, organization, and support from within the neighbor-
hood dedicated to the neighborhood’s revitalization.222 Thus, the needs, 
concerns, and strategies of community groups, religious organizations, 
tenant organizations, and non-profits in a neighborhood should be inte-
gral to any redevelopment plan and developers should be encouraged 
to collaborate and strategize with community leaders in drafting and 
implementing their projects.223 The best time to ensure that developers 
include community concerns in development plans is at the beginning, 
when a private developer is seeking zoning changes, easements, infra-
structure assistance, or even government funding.224 In return for this 
assistance, the city government can require the developer to include 
community groups at the planning table and make commitments to 
provide local benefits such as jobs and training.225 In this way, the devel-
oper, the city, and the neighborhood all benefit and progress can be 
made in neighborhoods which may otherwise degenerate into slums.226 
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Conclusion 
 Overall, the reaction to the Kelo opinion has led to some positive 
changes in state eminent domain laws, but for the most part has not 
substantially curbed abusive takings. Some states allow economic revi-
talization takings for any property that meets a broad definition of 
blight, simply shifting the burden of takings onto poor communities. 
Without further protections for affected communities or substantive 
limitations on private redevelopment takings, this eminent domain “re-
form” almost exactly mirrors the urban renewal programs of the past. 
Other states reacted to Kelo by banning private economic redevelop-
ment takings completely, effectively curbing state and local govern-
ments from pursuing private development projects to turn around de-
pressed communities. 
 With effective limitations and procedures, private development can 
be an important aspect of revitalizing entire neighborhoods and cities. 
Eminent domain is a crucial tool for governments to have available to 
pursue revitalization projects due to the potentially catastrophic effect of 
“holdouts.” Thus, states should not completely ban the use of eminent 
domain in private redevelopment. Instead, substantive limits should be 
placed on private redevelopment takings. These limits should include a 
prerequisite finding of narrowly defined “blight” for purposes of “eco-
nomic redevelopment” takings, procedural requirements before any 
taking occurs, enhanced compensation for displaced residents, and in-
centives for developers to integrate community concerns into redevel-
opment projects. 
